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Abstract—Crowdsourced wireless community network enables
individual users to share their private Wi-Fi access points (APs)
with each other, hence can achieve a large Wi-Fi coverage with
a small deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This paper presents
a novel contract-based incentive framework to incentivize such
a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete information
(where each user has certain private information such as mobility
pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). In the proposed framework,
the network operator designs and offers a set of contract items
to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price (that a user can
charge others for accessing his AP) and a subscription fee (that
a user needs to pay the operator for joining the community).
Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our
contract model each user’s best choice depends not only on his
private information but also on other users’ choices. This greatly
complicates the contract design, as the operator needs to analyze
the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the best choice
of each single user. We first derive the feasible contract that
guarantees the users’ truthful information disclosure based on the
equilibrium analysis of user choice, and then derive the optimal
(and feasible) contract that yields the maximal profit for the
operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher
Wi-Fi access quality is more likely to choose a higher Wi-Fi
access price and subscription fee, regardless of the user mobility
pattern. Simulation results further show that when increasing
the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator can gain
more profit, but (counter-intuitively) offer lower Wi-Fi access
prices and subscription fees for users.
Index Terms—Wi-Fi Crowdsourcing, Wireless Community
Networks, Incentive Mechanism, Contract Theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
W I-FI technology is playing an increasingly importantrole in today’s wireless communications. According to
Cisco [2], more than 50% of global mobile data traffic will be
carried via Wi-Fi in 2021. However, each Wi-Fi access point
(AP) often has a limited coverage, generally tens of meters [3].
Hence, to provide a city-wide or nation-wide Wi-Fi coverage,
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the network operator needs to deploy a huge number of Wi-Fi
APs, which is usually very expensive. As an example, KT, LG,
and SK Telecom in Korea have invested 44 million dollars to
provide Wi-Fi access at 10,000 hotspots in Seoul [4].
On the other hand, in-home Wi-Fi network is becoming
more and more popular during the past several years. Accord-
ing to [5], 66% of global households had deployed Wi-Fi APs
by 2014, and the percentage is expected to grow to 90% by
2019. This motivates us to study a new type of Wi-Fi network
that relies on aggregating (crowdsourcing) the large number
of existing home Wi-Fi APs already deployed by individual
users, instead of deploying new Wi-Fi APs. Such a novel Wi-Fi
network based on crowdsourcing is often called Crowdsourced
Wireless Community Network [6].
Specifically, a crowdsourced wireless community network
enables a set of individual users, who own private home Wi-
Fi APs, to form a community and share their home Wi-Fi APs
with each other [6]. These AP owners (APOs) are often called
community members. By crowdsourcing the massive home Wi-
Fi APs, it is possible to achieve a large (e.g., city-wide or
nation-wide) Wi-Fi coverage with a small deployment cost. A
successful commercial example of such a network is FON [7],
the world largest Wi-Fi community network with more than
20 million members globally. In practice, however, individual
APOs may not know each other personally, hence lack the
proper incentive to share Wi-Fi APs with each other [8–12].
Therefore, one of the important issues in such a community
network is to provide sufficient economic incentive for APOs,
such that they are willing to join the community and share
their Wi-Fi APs with each other.1
In this work, we focus on studying the incentive issue in
crowdsourced wireless community networks. In particular, we
consider the network scenario under incomplete information,
where each APO has certain private information (e.g., his
mobility pattern and his provided Wi-Fi access quality) not
known by the operator and other APOs. We aim to design an
incentive mechanism that (i) encourages individual APOs to
join the community network and share their home Wi-Fi APs
properly, and (ii) offers a considerable revenue for the network
operator to manage such a community network.
B. Model and Problem Formulation
We consider such a crowdsourced wireless community
network, where a set of individual APOs form a community
and share their Wi-Fi APs with each other. The community
network is open not only to the community members (i.e.,
1Another equally important issue is to guarantee the security and privacy
for community members, which can be achieved through proper hardware and
software solutions (as did in [7]), and is beyond the scope of this work.
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Figure 1. An Example of Crowdsourced Wireless Community Network
APOs) but also to those users (called Aliens) who do not own
Wi-Fi APs. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a community
network with 3 APOs and 2 Aliens, where APO 1 stays at
home and accesses his own AP, APO 2 travels to APO 3’s
home location and accesses AP 3, APO 3 travels to a location
without any member Wi-Fi coverage, and Aliens access APs
1 and 2, respectively.
Inspired by the success of FON [7] and the existing studies
[8–10], we consider two different sharing schemes for APOs
(to share their home Wi-Fi APs), corresponding to two differ-
ent membership types: Linus and Bill. Specifically,
• As a Linus, an APO can get free Wi-Fi access at other
APs in the community, and meanwhile he has to share
his own AP without any monetary compensation;
• As a Bill, an APO needs to pay for accessing other APs in
the community, and meanwhile he can earn some money
from sharing his own AP with others.
Note that Aliens always need to pay for accessing any AP in
the community (as they do not contribute APs). Thus, from the
network operator’s perspective, she will get all of the money
collected at Linus APs, while only part of the money collected
at Bill APs. Such a dual membership scheme has achieved a
great success in practice (e.g., FON [7]), as it captures two
major motivations for APOs to join the community: (i) getting
free Wi-Fi access and (ii) earning money.
In such a community network with dual membership, it is
natural to answer the following questions:
1) Membership Selection: which membership (i.e., Bill or
Linus) will each APO select?
2) Wi-Fi Pricing: how to set the Wi-Fi access price (for
Bills and Aliens) on each AP?
3) Revenue Division: how to divide the collected revenue
at each Bill AP between the operator and the Bill?2
Similar as in [8–10], we consider such an operation scenario
where APOs make their membership selection decisions and
the network operator makes the Wi-Fi pricing and revenue
division decision. We formulate the interactions between the
network operator and APOs as a two-stage decision process:
in Stage I, the network operator decides the Wi-Fi pricing and
revenue division strategy; in Stage II, each APO chooses the
membership, given the network operator’s strategy.
C. Solution and Contributions
Our focus is to design the pricing and revenue division
strategy for the network operator that provides sufficient incen-
2Note that the operator will get all revenue collected at a Linus AP.
tive for APOs (to join the community and choose the proper
memberships) and meanwhile maximizes her own profit. The
problem is challenging due to several reasons. First, each
APO is associated with certain private information (e.g., his
mobility pattern and the quality of his provided Wi-Fi access),
which cannot be observed by the network operator. Thus, it is
difficult for the network operator to predict the APO’s behavior
without the complete information. To this end, some incentive
mechanisms are necessary for eliciting the private information
of APOs. Second, APOs’ decisions are coupled with each
other, as one APO’s membership choice will affect other
APOs’ payoffs, hence affect their membership choices. Thus,
the comprehensive analysis of APOs’ equilibrium choices is
challenging, even if the operator’s pricing and revenue division
strategy are given [8, 9, 12].
Contract theory [13] is a promising theoretic tool for dealing
with problems with private information, and has been widely
adopted in wireless communication networks [14–21]. There-
fore, we propose a contract theoretic framework, in which (i)
the network operator offers a contract to APOs, which contains
a set of contract items, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access price
and a subscription fee for Bills; and (ii) each APO chooses the
best membership, and the best contract item if choosing to be
Bill. The key difference between the contract in this work and
the existing contracts in [14–21] is that in our contract, each
APO’s best choice depends not only on his private information
(as in existing contracts), but also on other APOs’ choices.
This greatly complicates the contract design, as the operator
needs to analyze the equilibrium choices of all APOs, rather
than the best choice of each single APO. In this work, we
will first analyze the feasibility of contract and then design
the optimal contract systematically.
In summary, the key contributions are summarized below.
• Novel Model: To our best knowledge, this is the first work
that applies the novel contract-based incentive mechanism
and derives the optimal contract to address the incentive
issue in crowdsourced wireless community networks.
• Novel Theoretical Results: The proposed contract mech-
anism is different from the existing contract mechanisms
in the literature due to the coupling of users’ choices. We
perform a comprehensive analysis for the users’ equilib-
rium choices, based on which we analyze the feasibility
and optimality of contract systematically.
• Practical Insights: Our analysis helps us to understand
how different users choose their Wi-Fi sharing schemes,
which facilitates the network operator to better optimize
her profit in different scenarios. Specifically, we find that
(i) a user who provides a higher quality Wi-Fi access is
more willing to be a Bill, and choose a larger price and a
higher subscription fee regardless of the mobility pattern;
(ii) a user who travels less is more likely to choose to be
a Bill to earn money by sharing his Wi-Fi with others;
and (iii) in a network with a larger average Wi-Fi quality,
the operator can gain more profit by setting lower prices
and subscription fees to all users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we review the related works. In Section III, we present
3the system model. In Sections IV-VI, we provide the contract
formulation, analyze the contract feasibility, and design the
optimal contract for the homogeneous mobility scenario. We
provide simulation results in Section VII and conclude in
Section VIII. Due to space limit, we put the detailed proofs
and the analysis for the heterogeneous mobility scenario in the
online technical report [29].
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Several recent works have studied the economics and in-
centive issues in crowdsourced wireless community networks,
including the user behavior analysis [8–10], the pricing scheme
design [11], and the competition analysis [12]. However, all
of the above works focused on the scenario of complete
information, where the network operator is assumed to know
the complete information of all APOs. In practice, however, it
is often difficult for the network operator to obtain some APO
information, e.g., the APO’s provided Wi-Fi access quality
and daily mobility pattern. In our work, we consider the more
practical incomplete information scenario.
Contract theory [13] is a promising theoretic tool for dealing
with problems under incomplete information and has been
widely-used in supply chain.3 Recently, contract theory has
also been introduced to analyze various wireless network prob-
lems, such as spectrum trading/reservation [14–16], dynamic
spectrum sharing [17, 18], D2D communications [19], energy
harvesting [20], and small-cell caching [21].4 The key differ-
ence between our contract and the existing contracts in [14–
21] is that in our contract, each APO’s best choice depends
not only on his private information but also on other APOs’
choices. Moreover, in our contract, the private information
of each APO is multi-dimensional (i.e., his provided Wi-Fi
access quality and his daily mobility pattern), which further
complicates the contract design.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a set N = {1, ..., N} of N individual APOs,
each owning a private home Wi-Fi AP, who form a community
and share their Wi-Fi APs with each other, leading to a
crowdsourced wireless community network. The community
network is managed (coordinated) by a network operator,
who is responsible for the necessary security, privacy, and
incentive issues in such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing. The
community network is open not only to APOs but also to a
set of NA = aN users (called Aliens) who do not own Wi-
Fi APs, where a ≥ 0 is the ratio between Aliens and APOs.
Aliens have to pay for accessing the community network (as
they do not contribute APs) through, for example, purchasing
Wi-Fi passes from the operator.
3Another important tool for dealing with problems with incomplete infor-
mation is auction theory [22], which has also been widely-used in wireless
networks [23–25]. Auction is more useful for the scenario of allocating limited
resources among a set of users with incomplete (asymmetric) information,
while contract is more useful for the scenario of motivating different types of
users (with private information) behave in a desired way.
4A comprehensive survey of the applications of contract theory in wireless
networks can be found in [? ].
To ensure the necessary security and privacy, each AP’s
channel is divided into two parts: a private channel (for the
APO’s own use) and a public channel (for other traveling
users’ access). This can be achieved by either specialized hard-
wares (e.g., customized AP routers as in FON [26]) or specific
software built in the AP. Under such a channel division, a
traveling user’s access to an AP (on the public channel) will
not affect the communication of the owner of that particular
AP (on the private channel), but will affect other traveling
users who access the same AP simultaneously.
1) Wi-Fi Access Quality: The Wi-Fi access quality provided
by different APOs for traveling users (on their public channels)
may be different, due to the different wireless characteristics
(such as Wi-Fi standard, backhaul, public channel bandwidth,
channel fading, and network congestion) and location popular-
ities. For example, the Wi-Fi access in a popular location may
be more valuable than that in a unpopular location, and hence
the APO may choose to install an AP with a carrier grade
Wi-Fi standard that provides a better quality than a regular
home Wi-Fi. The Wi-Fi access quality provided by an APO
will affect traveling users’ lengths of connection on this APO’s
Wi-Fi, hence affect the APO’s potential revenue from sharing
his AP (see Section IV-A2 for more details).
2) APO Type: To facilitate the later analysis, we consider a
discrete APO (quality) model with a discrete set of K possible
Wi-Fi access qualities. Thus, we can classify all APOs into K
types, according to the Wi-Fi access qualities that they provide
for traveling users (on their public channels).5 Namely, the
same type APOs will provide the same Wi-Fi access quality.
Let θk denote the Wi-Fi access quality provided by a type-k
APO, and Nk denote the number of type-k APOs. Without
loss of generality, we assume that
θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θK .
It is important to note that the exact type (quality) of each
APO is his private information, and cannot be observed by the
network operator or other APOs. Similar as in many existing
works [14–21], we assume that the distribution information
regarding APO type (i.e., {θk : k ∈ K} and {Nk : k ∈ K},
where K = {1, ...,K}) is public information and known by the
network operator and all APOs. Such distribution information
of APO type can be obtained through, for example, historical
information or long-term learning.
3) APO Membership: As in [7–10], an APO can share his
Wi-Fi AP in two different ways, corresponding to two different
membership types: Linus and Bill. Specifically,
• As a Linus, an APO can get free Wi-Fi access at other
APs in the community, and meanwhile he has to share
his own AP without any monetary compensation.
• As a Bill, an APO needs to pay for accessing other APs in
the community, and meanwhile he can earn some money
from sharing his own AP with others.
Moreover, Aliens always need to pay for accessing any AP in
the community, as they do not contribute APs. Thus, from the
network operator’s perspective, she will get all of the money
5Note that such a discrete quality model can well approximate the contin-
uous quality model by choosing a sufficiently large K.
4Table I
A SUMMARY OF THREE USER TYPES
Type Pay for usingother APs
Paid by sharing
his AP
Subscription
fee
Linus No No No
Bill Yes Yes Yes
Alien Yes N.A. N.A.
collected at Linus APs (paid by Bills and Aliens), while only
part of the money collected at Bill APs (paid by other Bills
and Aliens). In this work, the network operator will design
the Wi-Fi access pricing and revenue sharing (with Bills), and
APOs will choose the proper memberships.
Let pn ($/min) denote the Wi-Fi access price that the
network operator designs for AP n ∈ N , for charging Bills
(other than APO n) and Aliens who access AP n. Then,
• When an APO n chooses to be a Bill, he needs to pay
for accessing every other AP m at a unit price pm (per
unit Wi-Fi connection time) and meanwhile he can charge
other users (i.e., Bills and Aliens) for accessing his AP
at a unit price pn.
• When an APO n chooses to be a Linus, he neither
pays for accessing other APs, nor charges other users
for accessing his AP. In this case, the network operator
will instead charge other users (i.e., Bills and Aliens) for
accessing AP n.
The revenue division between the network operator and each
Bill (APO) is via a subscription fee that the operator charges
the Bill. Let δn ($) denote the subscription fee that the network
operator charges Bill n ∈ N . Note that δn can be negative,
which is essentially a bonus from the operator to incentivize
APO n to be a Bill. Moreover, Linus does not need to pay any
subscription fee. For clarity, we summarize the properties of
different users (i.e., Bill, Linus, and Alien) in Table I.
4) APO Mobility: To concentrate on the impact of Wi-
Fi access quality, in this work we first consider a simple
homogeneous mobility pattern for APOs, where (i) APOs stay
at “home” with the same probability η, hence travels outside
with probability 1 − η, and (ii) when traveling outside, each
APO travels to every other AP with the same probability 1−ηN .
6
Moreover, we assume that each Alien travels to every AP with
the same probability 1N . Our analysis in Sections IV–VI will
be based on this homogeneous mobility pattern.
In our online technical report [29], we will further consider
a more general heterogeneous mobility pattern, where different
APOs may have different mobility patterns. That is, different
APOs may have different probabilities of staying at home
(traveling outside). Note that in this case, an APO’s mobility
pattern is also his private information.
IV. CONTRACT FORMULATION
To deal with the private information, we propose a contract-
based operation scheme, where the operator provides a set of
contract items for each APO to choose.
Specifically, each contract item is the combination of a Wi-
Fi access price and a subscription fee, denoted by φ , (p, δ).
6Here we use the approximation 1−η
N−1 ≈ 1−ηN as N is usually large.
Table II
KEY NOTATIONS
K The set of APO types, K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}
θk The Wi-Fi quality provided by the type-k APOs
Nk The number of the type-k APOs
pk The unit Wi-Fi access price at the type-k APs
δk The subscription fee of the type-k APOs
φk The contract item designed for the type-k APOs
φ0 The contract item chosen by Linus
Φ The contract provided by the network operator
B(Φ) The set of APO types choosing Bills under Φ
L(Φ) The set of APO types choosing Linus under Φ
NB(Φ) The number of Bills, NB(Φ) =
∑
k∈B(Φ)Nk
NL(Φ) The number of Linus, NL(Φ) =
∑
k∈L(Φ)Nk
NA The number of Aliens, NA = aN
a The ratio between Aliens and APOs, a ≥ 0
η The probability of an APO staying at home
A special contract item φ0 = (0, 0) is used to indicate the
choice of being Linus. Based on the revelation principle [27],
the operator needs to design one contract item for each type of
APOs, to induce them to truthfully reveal their types. Hence
a contract is such a list of contract items, denoted by
Φ = {φk : k ∈ K} , {(pk, δk) : k ∈ K}, (1)
where φk , (pk, δk) denotes the contract item designed for the
type-k APOs. Note that the same type APOs will choose the
same contract item, as they have the same parameters, which
will be justified later in Section IV-B.
A contract is feasible if each APO is willing to choose
the contract item designed for his type (i.e., achieving the
maximum payoff under the item designed for his type). A
contract is optimal if it maximizes the network operator’s
profit, taking the APOs’ truthful information disclosure into
consideration. We will study the feasibility and optimality of
contract in Sections V and VI, respectively.
A. Operator Profit
We now characterize the network operator’s profit under a
given feasible contract Φ = {φk : k ∈ K}, where each APO
will choose the contract item designed for his type.
Let L(Φ) , {k ∈ K | φk = φ0} denote the set of APO types
choosing Linus and NL(Φ) =
∑
k∈L(Φ)Nk denote the total
number of Linus. Let B(Φ) , {k ∈ K | φk 6= φ0} denote the
set of APO types choosing Bills and NB(Φ) =
∑
k∈B(Φ)Nk
denote the total number of Bills. Whenever there is no
confusion, we will also write L(Φ),B(Φ), NL(Φ), NB(Φ) as
L,B, NL, NB for notational convenience. Table II lists the key
notations in this paper.
1) Profit Achieved from a Bill AP: If a type-k APO is a
Bill who chooses φk = (pk, δk), the operator’s profit achieved
from this AP is simply the subscription fee δk.
2) Profit Achieved from a Linus AP: If a type-k APO
is a Linus who chooses φk = φ0, the network operator
will charge other users (Bills and Aliens) accessing this AP
directly, at a price p0 per unit Wi-Fi connection time. With the
assumption of homogeneous mobility, the expected number of
Bills accessing this AP is
∑
i∈B
1−η
N Ni =
1−η
N NB , and the
expected number of Aliens accessing this AP is NAN = a.
We further denote the average Wi-Fi connection time of a
Bill or Alien on this (type-k) AP under the price p as dk(p).
5Intuitively, dk(p) reflects a Bill’s or Alien’s demand for using
a type-k AP, which is non-negative, monotonically decreasing
with the price p, and monotonically increasing with quality
θk. We will further discuss the demand function at the end of
Section IV. Based on the above analysis, the total profit from
this type-k Linus AP is:(
1−η
N NB(Φ) + a
)
p0dk(p0), (2)
where p0 is the price charged by the operator on Linus AP.
3) Total Profit: To summarize, the network operator’s profit
achieved from all APs can be computed as follows:∑
k∈L(Φ)
[
Nk
(
1−η
N NB(Φ) + a
)
p0dk(p0)
]
+
∑
k∈B(Φ)Nkδk,
(3)
where the first term is the total profit from all Linus APs and
the second term is the total profit from all Bill APs.
B. APO Payoff
We now define the payoff of each APO under a feasible
contract Φ = {φk : k ∈ K}, where each APO will choose the
contract item designed for his type.
1) Payoff of a Linus: If a type-k APO chooses to be a
Linus (i.e., φk = φ0), he neither pays for using other APs,
nor gains from sharing his own AP. Hence, his payment is
zero, and his payoff is simply the difference between utility
and cost. Let constant UH denote the utility when staying at
home and accessing Wi-Fi through his own AP, constant UR
denote the utility when traveling outside and accessing Wi-
Fi through other APs, and constant CS denote the cost (e.g.,
energy, bandwidth) of serving other users. Note that UH, UR,
and CS do not depend on the APO’s membership choice. Then
a type-k Linus APO’s payoff is:
uk(φ0) = uk(0, 0) = ηUH + (1− η)UR − CS. (4)
2) Payoff of a Bill: If a type-k APO chooses to be a Bill
(i.e., φk 6= φ0), his payment consists of (i) the revenue earned
at his own AP, (ii) the payment for accessing other APs, and
(iii) the subscription fee to the network operator.
First, the revenue earned at his own AP equals the payment
of other Bills and Aliens accessing his AP. The average Wi-Fi
connection time of a Bill or Alien on this (type-k) AP under
the price pk is dk(pk). The average payment of a Bill or Alien
for accessing this AP is
gk(pk) , pkdk(pk), (5)
which monotonically increases with the Wi-Fi quality θk,
as the demand dk(pk) monotonically increases with θk. The
expected number of paying users (including the other Nk − 1
Bills of type-k, all Bills of other types, and all Aliens)
accessing this AP depends on the given contract Φ, and can
be computed as follows:
ω(Φ) , 1−ηN (NB(Φ)− 1) + NAN . (6)
Note that ω(Φ) does not depend on k, i.e., same for all Bills.
Thus, the revenue earned at his own AP is ω(Φ)gk(pk).
Second, the expected payment of this (type-k) APO for
accessing other APs includes (i) the payment for accessing
the other Nk − 1 Bill APs of type-k, (ii) the payment for
accessing all Bill APs of other types, and (iii) the payment
for accessing Linus APs, which can be calculated as
βk(Φ) , 1−ηN
[
(Nk − 1)gk(pk) +
∑
i∈B(Φ),i6=kNigi(pi)
+
∑
j∈L(Φ)Njgj(p0)
]
. (7)
Similarly, when there is no confusion, we will also write ω
and βk for ω(Φ) and βk(Φ), respectively.
Third, the subscription fee to the network operator is δk.
Hence, a type-k Bill APO’s total revenue (when choosing φk
under a feasible contract Φ) is ω(Φ)gk(pk) − δk − βk(Φ).
Based on the definition of UH, UR, and CS in Section IV-B1,
the type-k Bill APO’s payoff is
uk(φk; Φ) = uk(pk, δk; Φ) =ω(Φ)gk(pk)− δk − βk(Φ)
+ ηUH + (1− η)UR − CS.
(8)
Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper, we
normalize ηUH + (1− η)UR − CS = 0.
By (8), we can see that the payoff of an APO depends not
only on his contract item choice, but also on other APOs’
choices. For example, the first term in ω(Φ) depends on how
many APOs choose to be Bills, the second term in βk(Φ)
depends on how other Bills choose prices, and the last term in
βk(Φ) depends on how many APOs choose to be Linus. Such
a strategy coupling makes our contract design problem very
different from and more challenging to analyze than traditional
contract models in literatures [14–21].
To make the model more practical and meanwhile facilitate
the later analysis, we introduce the following assumptions:
(a) 0 ≤ pk ≤ pmax, ∀k ∈ K;
(b) gk(p) increases with p ∈ [0, pmax], ∀k ∈ K;
(c) gi(p′)− gi(p) > gj(p′)− gj(p), for any types i > j and
prices p′ > p (where p, p′ ∈ [0, pmax]).
Assumption (a) implies that there is a maximum allowable
price pmax for Wi-Fi access, which is ofter lower than the
corresponding cellular access price. This is because the Wi-
Fi access is usually a complement to the cellular access,
and hence a high Wi-Fi access price may drive all APOs to
the cellular network when traveling. Assumption (b) implies
that the demand of APOs (on other APs) is inelastic when
p ∈ [0, pmax]. When Wi-Fi costs so little that users use it like
water, increasing the price of Wi-Fi access will not reduce
revenue. Assumption (c) implies that when increasing the Wi-
Fi access price by a small value, the payment of a higher type
APO (i.e., with a higher quality) will be increased by a larger
value than that of a lower-type APO. This is ofter referred to
as “increasing differences [28]” in economics, and is satisfied
for many widely-used demand functions. One widely-used
demand function that satisfies the above assumptions is:
dk(p) =
T
1+p/θk
. (9)
Here T is the length of per subscription period (e.g., one
month).7 Note that our analysis is general and does not rely
on the specific form of (9).
7Function dk(p) is decreasing convex in p. When p = 0, dk(0) = T ,
which represents the maximum length of connection time. We may also
multiple a constant less than 1 to the demand function, for example, to
represent that the users will not connect 24 hours a day even with zero price.
Such a constant scaling will not change the analysis results.
6V. FEASIBILITY OF CONTRACT
In this section, we will study the sufficient and necessary
conditions for a contract to be feasible. Formally, a contract is
feasible, if and only if it satisfies the Incentive Compatibility
(IC) and Individual Rationality (IR) constraints.
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility – IC). A contract Φ =
{φk : k ∈ K} is incentive compatible, if for each type-k
APO, he can achieve the maximum payoff when choosing the
contract item φk intended for his type k, i.e.,
uk(φk; Φ) ≥ uk(φi; Φ), ∀k, i ∈ K. (10)
Definition 2 (Individual Rationality – IR). A contract Φ =
{φk : k ∈ K} is individual rational, if for each type-k APO,
he can achieve a non-negative payoff when choosing the item
φk intended for his type k, i.e.,
uk(φk; Φ) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K. (11)
Obviously, if a contract satisfies the IC and IR constraints,
each APO will choose the contract item designed for his
type. Hence, we can equivalently say that each APO truthfully
reveals his type (private information) to the operator, which
forms a Nash equilibrium.
In what follows, we will provide the necessary and sufficient
conditions for feasible contracts. Due to space limit, we will
put the detailed proofs in the online technical report [29].
A. Necessary Conditions
We first show the necessary conditions for a feasible con-
tract. For convenience, we rewrite a feasible contract as
Φ = {(0, 0) : k ∈ L} ∪ {(pk, δk) : k ∈ B},
where L and B are the type sets of Linus and Bills, respec-
tively, and both are functions of Φ.8 Then, we have:
Lemma 1. If a contract Φ = {(0, 0) : k ∈ L} ∪ {(pk, δk) :
k ∈ B} is feasible, then
pi > pj ⇐⇒ δi > δj , ∀i, j ∈ B.
Lemma 2. If a contract Φ = {(0, 0) : k ∈ L} ∪ {(pk, δk) :
k ∈ B} is feasible, then
θi > θj =⇒ pi > pj , ∀i, j ∈ B.
Lemma 3. If a contract Φ = {(0, 0) : k ∈ L} ∪ {(pk, δk) :
k ∈ B} is feasible, then there exists a critical APO type m ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K + 1}, such that k ∈ L for all k < m and k ∈ B
for all k ≥ m, i.e.,
L = {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1},B = {m,m+ 1, . . . ,K}. (12)
Lemma 1 shows that in a feasible contract, a larger Wi-
Fi access price must correspond to a larger subscription fee.
Lemma 2 shows that in a feasible contract, a higher type APO
will be designed with a higher Wi-Fi access price. Lemma 3
shows that there exists a critical APO type: all APOs with
types lower than the critical type will choose to be Linus, and
all APOs with types higher than or equal to the critical type
will choose to be Bills. When all APOs are Bills, we have
m = 1; when all APOs are Linus, we have m = K + 1.
8Here we omit the parameter Φ for notation simplicity.
B. Sufficient and Necessary Conditions
We now show that the above necessary conditions together
are also sufficient for a contract to be feasible. For notational
convenience, we denote µ(Φ) as the expected number of Bills
and Aliens accessing a particular AP and ν(Φ) as the expected
payment of a particular APO (for accessing other APs) when
choosing to be a Bill. That is,
µ(Φ) , 1−ηN NB(Φ) +
NA
N ,
ν(Φ) , 1−ηN
( ∑
i∈B(Φ)
Nigi(pi) +
∑
i∈L(Φ)
Nigi(p0)
)
.
Then, the sufficient and necessary conditions for a feasible
contract can be characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Feasible Contract). A contract Φ = {φk : k ∈ K}
is feasible, if and only if the following conditions hold:
L = {1, . . . ,m− 1},B = {m, . . . ,K}, m ∈ {1, ...,K + 1},
(13)
0 ≤ p0 ≤ pmax, 0 ≤ pi ≤ pk ≤ pmax, ∀k, i ∈ B, i < k, (14)
δk ≥ δk , µ(Φ)gj(pk)− ν(Φ), ∀k ∈ B,∀j ∈ L, (15)
δk ≤ δ¯k , ω(Φ)gk(pk)− βk(Φ), ∀k ∈ B, (16)
ω(Φ) (gi(pk)− gi(pi)) ≤ δk − δi ≤ ω(Φ) (gk(pk)− gk(pi)) ,
∀k, i ∈ B, i < k. (17)
In the above theorem, the condition (15) can be derived from
the IC constraints of Linus APOs, i.e., a type-j Linus APO
will achieve a non-positive payoff if he chooses any contract
item designed for Bills, i.e., (pk, δk), k ∈ B. Similarly, the
conditions (16) and (17) can be derived from the IR and IC
constraints of Bill APOs.
VI. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN
In this section, we study the optimal contract that maxi-
mizes the network operator’s profit. We focus on finding an
optimal contract from the feasible contract set characterized
by Theorem 1. By the revelation principle [27], the optimal
contract within the feasible set is the global optimal contract
among all possible (feasible and non-feasible) contracts.
A. Optimal Contract Formulation
By Theorem 1 and the revelation principle, we can formu-
late the following contract optimization problem:
Problem 1 (Optimal Contract).
max
∑
k∈L
[
Nk
(
(1− η)NB
N
+ a
)
gk(p0)
]
+
∑
k∈B
Nkδk
s.t. (13), (14), (15), (16), (17)
var: m, p0, {(pk, δk) : k ∈ B}.
In Problem 1, m is the critical AP type; p0 is the Wi-Fi
access price on Linus APs, where the network operator will
charge Bills or Aliens with this price p0; and (pk, δk), k ∈ B,
are the Wi-Fi access prices and subscription fees for Bills.
Next we define the feasible price assignment, which we will
use in later discussions.
7Definition 3 (Feasible Price Assignment). A price assignment
{p0, pk : k ∈ B} is feasible if it satisfies constraint (14).
We will solve Problem 1 in the sequential manner. First,
we derive the best subscription fees {δk : k ∈ B}, given the
feasible price assignment {p0, pk : k ∈ B} and critical type
m. Then, we design an algorithm to compute the optimal price
assignment {p0, pk : k ∈ B}, given the critical type m. Finally,
substituting the best subscription fees and price assignment,
we search the critical type m for the optimal contract.
B. Optimal Subscription Fee
We first derive the best subscription fees, given the feasi-
ble price assignment and critical type. The subscription fee
optimization problem is given below.
Problem 2 (Optimal Subscription Fees).
max
∑
k∈B
Nkδk
s.t. (15), (16), (17)
var: δk, k ∈ B.
It is easy to see that Problem 2 is a linear programming.
The optimal solution is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Given a critical type m ∈ {1, . . . ,K + 1} and
a feasible price assignment {p0, pk : k ∈ B}, the optimal
subscription fees {δ∗k : k ∈ B} are given by:
δ∗m = ωgm(pm)− βm, (18)
δ∗k = δ
∗
k−1 + ω (gk(pk)− gk(pk−1)) , (19)
for all k ∈ {m+ 1, ...,K}.
Note that ω and βm depends on the critical type m and the
price assignment {p0, pk : k ∈ B}, and can be calculated by
(6) and (7), respectively. For convenience, we denote
sk =
K∑
i=k
Ni,∀k ∈ B.
Then, we can rewrite the network operator’s profit from Bill
APOs in the following way:∑
k∈B
Nkδ
∗
k =
∑
k∈B
fk(pk),
where
fk(pk) =

(
1−η
N + ω
)
skgk(pk)− ωsk+1gk+1(pk), k = m
ωskgk(pk)− ωsk+1gk+1(pk), m < k < K
ωNkgk(pk), k = K
It is easy to see that fk(pk) is related to pk only, while
independent of pt for all t 6= k.
C. Optimal Price Assignment
Next we derive the optimal price assignment, given a fixed
critical type m. Substitute the best subscription fees {δ∗k :
k ∈ B} derived in Lemma 4, we can formulate the following
optimal price assignment problem.
Problem 3 (Optimal Price Assignment).
max
∑
k∈L
[
Nk
(
(1− η)NB
N
+ a
)
gk(p0)
]
+
∑
k∈B
fk(pk)
s.t. (14)
var: p0, {pk : k ∈ B}.
We denote the solution of Problem 3 as {p∗0, p∗k : k ∈ B},
which depends on the critical type m. Hence, we will also
write {p∗0, p∗k : k ∈ B} as {p∗0(m), p∗k(m) : k ∈ B} when we
want to emphasize such dependances.
It is easy to see that the optimal price p∗0 for Linus is
always the price upper-bound pmax, i.e., p∗0 = pmax. This is
because gk(p0) monotonically increases with p0 ∈ [0, pmax].
The optimal price assignment {p∗k : k ∈ B} for Bills can be
solved by the following optimization problem:
max
pm,...,pK
∑
k∈B
fk(pk) (20)
s.t. 0 ≤ pm ≤ pm+1 ≤ · · · ≤ pK ≤ pmax.
Since fk(pk) only depends on pk, we can compute the
maximizer of each fk(pk) individually, and check whether the
feasible price condition in (20) is satisfied. Let p†k denote the
price that maximizes fk(pk), i.e.,
p†k = arg max0≤pk≤pmax
fk(pk), ∀k ∈ B. (21)
Note that if {p†k : k ∈ B} satisfies the constraint in (20),
i.e., it is a feasible price assignment, then it is exactly the
optimal solution of Problem 3, i.e., p∗k = p
†
k,∀k ∈ B. In
some cases, however, {p†k : k ∈ B} may not satisfy the
constraint in (20), and hence is not feasible. In such cases,
we can adopt a dynamic algorithm (similar as that in [14]) to
adjust the price assignment gradually, such that in each step, at
least one infeasible price sub-sequence will be removed.9 The
key idea is to optimize all prices in an infeasible price sub-
sequence together, rather than optimizing them individually.
Due to space limit, we put the detailed algorithm in our online
technical report [29].
D. Optimal Critical Type
Finally, after obtaining the optimal subscription fees in Sec-
tion VI-B and the optimal price assignment in Section VI-C,
we can find the optimal critical type m∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,K + 1}
through exhaustive search. Obviously, we only need to search
K + 1 times for the optimal critical type m∗.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we first simulate a network where all APOs
have the homogeneous mobility pattern in Section VII-A, and
then simulate a network where APOs have heterogeneous
mobility patterns in Section VII-B.10
9An infeasible price sub-sequence refers to a subset of prices that do not
satisfy the constraint in (20).
10For more details about the heterogeneous mobility scenario, please refer
to our online technical report [29]
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A. Optimal Contract and Impact of Alien Number
We simulate a network with N = 200 APOs and NA =
10 Aliens. The APOs are classified into K = 20 types with
Wi-Fi qualities θ = {1, 2, . . . , 20}. Each APO stays at home
with probability η = 0.5, and travels to other APs with the
same probability (i.e., 0.5199 ). The maximum allowable Wi-Fi
access price is pmax = 5. We study the optimal contracts under
three different APO type distributions illustrated in Figure 2:
In case I, the population is low type APO dominant; In case
II, the population is medium type APO dominant; and In case
III, the population is high type APO dominant. Figures 3 and
4 illustrate the optimal contract items offered to Bills (i.e.,
the subscription fees and Wi-Fi access prices) in three cases.
Figure 5 shows the payoff of each APO in three cases.
By Figures 3–5, we have the following observations for the
optimal contracts in the above three cases.
Observation 1. The subscription fee can be negative, in which
the operator gives bonus to APOs for sharing Wi-Fi. Moreover,
the subscription fee in Case I (low type APO dominant) is the
highest one among all cases (Figure 3).
As a lower type APO charges a smaller price at his own
AP but pays higher prices to higher type APOs, his payoff can
be negative without proper compensation from the operator.
Hence, the network operator will give bonus to the lower type
APO for joining the community and sharing Wi-Fi. In the low
type APO dominant case (Case I), each type APO’s payoff as
a Bill is higher comparing with other two cases, since lower
type APOs charge smaller prices and on average it is less
expensive to use other APs. Hence, the network operator will
set higher subscription fees to extract more profit.
Observation 2. The Wi-Fi access price in Case I (low type
APO dominant) is the highest one among all cases (Figure 4).
The highest price in Figure 4 corresponds to the highest
subscription fee in Figure 3. An APO will choose a higher
price since he needs to pay a higher subscription fee.
Observation 3. A higher type Bill APO gains more payoff
than a lower type Bill APO under all three cases. Moreover,
for each particular APO, it can achieve the largest payoff in
Case I (low type APO dominant) among all cases (Figure 5).
The reason is that the higher type APO receives more
revenue on his own AP and pays less to other lower type
APOs, hence achieves a payoff higher than that of a lower
type APO. In the low type APO dominant case (Case I), on
average each Bill APO pays less to access other APs than in
other two cases. This turns out to be the dominant factor in
determining the payoff, although every Bill APO pays more
to the operator (Observation 1) and charges other users more
(Observation 2).
Next, we study how the ratio of Aliens and APOs (i.e.,
a = NAN ) affects the optimal contract. Figure 6 shows the
critical AP type m under different values of a in three cases,
where we fix N = 200 and change NA from 0 to 20000 (hence
a changes from 0 to 100). Figure 7 shows the operator’s profit
per user (including Aliens) under different values of a in three
cases, where we fix N = 200 and change NA from 0 to 1800
(hence a = NA/N changes from 0 to 9).
By Figures 6 and 7, we can obtain the following observa-
tions for the optimal contracts in the above three cases.
Observation 4. More APOs will choose to be Linus in Case
III (high type APO dominant) than in other cases (Figure 6).
The reason is that higher type APOs charge higher prices
(and many of them charge pmax). In the high type APO
dominant case (Case III), on average it is more expensive for
a Bill to access other APs. As a result, a lower type APO’s
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payoff as a Bill is smaller due to the higher payment on other
APs. Hence, more APOs will choose to be Linus.
Observation 5. The number of APOs choosing to be Linus
increases with the number of Aliens (Figure 6).
Recall the operator’s total profit defined in (3), i.e.,∑
k∈L
[
Nk
(
(1− η)NBN + a
)
gk(p0)
]
+
∑
k∈BNkδk.
The operator sets the same price on all Linus APs as
p0 = pmax. As a increases, the term agk(pmax) becomes
increasingly important for the operator’s total revenue. Hence,
in the optimal contract, the operator increases m to gain more
revenue from Aliens’ Wi-Fi access on Linus APs.
Observation 6. The network operator’s profit per user in-
creases with the number of Aliens. Moreover, given the number
of Aliens, the operator’s profit per user in Case III (high type
APO dominant) is the largest one among all cases (Figure 7).
The operator’s profit per user increases with a, as more
Aliens bring more revenue. The operator’s profit is the largest
in the high type APO dominant case (Case III). This is because
when the Wi-Fi quality increases, users generate more demand
in the network, and hence the operator gains more revenue.
B. Heterogeneous Mobility Scenario
We now provide simulation results for the heterogeneous
mobility scenario. We simulate a network with NA = 2400
Aliens and N = 4000 APOs with L = 2 mobility patterns (η1
and η2) and K = 20 Wi-Fi qualities θ = {1, 2, . . . , 20}. The
maximum allowable Wi-Fi access price is pmax = 10.
In our online technical report [29], we have theoretically
proved that if η1 < η2, then m1 ≥ m2. Here, we numerically
show how the critical AP types m1 and m2 change with the
mobility parameters η. Figure 8 shows the critical AP types
{m1,m2} under different values of η1 when η2 = 0.8.
Observation 7. The critical AP type m1 decreases with η1,
i.e., more APOs who stay at home with probability η1 choose
to be Bills as η1 increases (Figure 8).
The reason is that as η1 increases, APOs with η1 stay at
home with a larger probability, while travel to other APs with
a smaller probability. So APOs with η1 prefer to be Bills to
gain profit at his own APs rather than be Linus to enjoy free
Wi-Fi at other APs. Hence, more APOs with η1 choose to be
Bills as η1 increases.
Observation 8. (a) The critical AP type m2 first decreases
with η1, i.e., more APOs who stay at home with probability
η2 choose to be Bills as η1 increases. (b) When η1 is large
enough, i.e., η1 > 0.7, m2 increases with η1, i.e., less APOs
who stay at home with probability η2 choose to be Bills as η1
increases (Figure 8).
The reason for Observation 8(a) is that as η1 increases from
small to medium values, more APOs with η1 choose to be
Bills (Observation 7). Since the number of paying users (Bills)
increases, APOs with η2 can gain larger profit if they choose
to be Bills. Hence, more APOs with η2 choose to be Bills.
The reason for Observation 8(b) is that as η1 increases from
medium to large values, Bill APOs with η1 stay at home with
a larger probability, so the profit achieved by Bills from these
paying users (Bill APOs with η1) will decrease. Hence, less
APOs with η2 choose to be Bills.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel contract mechanism for
crowdsourced wireless community networks under incomplete
information. Different from existing contract mechanisms in
the literature, the proposed contract considers the coupling
among users’ contract item choices, hence is more complicated
to design. We analyzed the feasibility and optimality of the
proposed contract systematically based on the user equilibrium
analysis. We also provided simulation results to illustrate the
optimal contract and the profit gain of the operator. Our
analysis helps us to understand how different users choose
their Wi-Fi sharing schemes, which facilitates the network
operator to better optimize her profit in different network and
information scenarios. As for the future work, it is important to
study a more general model with heterogeneous users, where
different users may have different traffic demands and mobility
patterns. It is also interesting to study the competition among
multiple network operators.
REFERENCES
[1] Q. Ma, L. Gao, Y.-F. Liu, and J. Huang, “A Contract-
based Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourced Wireless
Community Networks,” Proc. IEEE WiOpt, 2016.
[2] Cisco, “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile
Data Traffic Forecast Update 2016–2021,” Feb 2017.
[3] Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi
[4] Bandwidth Place, “WiFi Hotspots Becoming a Thing of
The Past – 3 Cities With WiFi Everywhere,” Oct 2013.
[5] IHS, “Nine in 10 Global Broadband Households to Have
Service Provider Wi-Fi by 2019,” Jun 2015.
[6] Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
wireless_community_networks_by_region
[7] FON website: https://corp.fon.com/en
[8] Q. Ma, L. Gao, Y.-F. Liu, and J. Huang, “Economic Anal-
ysis of Crowdsourced Wireless Community Networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2016.
[9] Q. Ma, L. Gao, Y.-F. Liu, and J. Huang, “A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of User Behaviors in Crowdsourced
Wireless Community Networks,” IEEE WiOpt, 2015.
10
[10] G. Camponovo and A. P. Schwendener, “Motivations of
Hybrid Wireless Community: A Qualitative Analysis of
Swiss FON Members,” Proc. IEEE ICMB, 2011.
[11] M. Afrasiabi and R. Guerin, “Pricing Strategies for User-
Provided Connectivity Services,” IEEE INFOCOM, 2012
[12] M.H. Manshaei, J. Freudiger, et al., “On Wireless Social
Community Networks,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2008.
[13] P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont, Contract Theory, MIT
Press, 2005.
[14] L. Gao, X. Wang, Y. Xu, and Q. Zhang, “Spectrum Trad-
ing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic
Modeling Approach,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, 29(4):843-855, 2011.
[15] Y. Luo, L. Gao, and J. Huang, “Spectrum Reservation
Contract Design in TV White Space Networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Net-
works, 1(2):147-160, 2015.
[16] L. Gao, J. Huang, Y. Chen, and B. Shou, “An Integrated
Contract and Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum
Trading,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communi-
cations, 31(3):581-592, 2013.
[17] D. M. Kalathil and R. Jain, “Spectrum Sharing Through
Contracts,” Proc. IEEE DySPAN, 2010.
[18] L. Duan, L. Gao, and J. Huang, “Cooperative Spectrum
Sharing: A Contract-Based Approach,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Mobile Computing, 13(1):174-187, 2014.
[19] Y. Zhang, L. Song, W. Saad, Z. Dawy, and Z. Han,
“Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Device-To-
Device Communications in Cellular Networks,” IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2015.
[20] Z. Hou, H. Chen, Y. Li, et al., “A Contract-Based Incen-
tive Mechanism for Energy Harvesting-Based Internet of
Things,” Proc. IEEE ICC, 2017.
[21] T. Liu, J. Li, F. Shu, and Z. Han, “Resource Trading for
A Small-Cell Caching System: A Contract-Theory Based
Approach,” Proc. IEEE WCNC, 2017.
[22] L. Einav, C. Farronato, J. Levin, and N. Sundaresan,
“Auctions Versus Posted Prices In Online Markets,”
Journal of Political Economy, 2016.
[23] L. Gao, Y. Xu, and X. Wang, “MAP: Multi-Auctioneer
Progressive Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 10(8), 2011.
[24] J. Huang, R. A. Berry, and M. L. Honig, “Auction-based
spectrum sharing,” ACM/Springer Mobile Networks and
Applications, 11(3):405-418, 2006.
[25] G. Iosifidis, L. Gao, J. Huang, and L. Tassiulas, “A
Double Auction Mechanism for Mobile Data Offload-
ing Markets,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
23(5):1634-1647, 2014.
[26] FON website: https://support.fon.com/hc/en-us
/articles/200535292-How-do-I-set-up-the-Fonera-via-
its-web-interface-
[27] R. B. Myerson, “Incentive-Compatibility and the Bar-
gaining Problem,” Econometrica, 1979.
[28] R. Amir, “Supermodularity and Complementarity in Eco-
nomics: An Elementary Survey,” Southern Economic
Journal, 2005.
[29] Online Technical Report: http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.09391
Qian Ma (M’18) is a postdoc researcher in the De-
partment of Information Engineering at The Chinese
University of Hong Kong. She received the B.Sc.
degree in 2012 from Beijing University of Posts
and Telecommunications, Beijing, China, and the
Ph.D. degree in 2017 from The Chinese University
of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China. During her
Ph.D. study, she visited Professor Tamer Basar at
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from
September 2015 to February 2016. Her research
interests lie in the field of wireless communications
and network economics. She is the recipient of the Best Student Paper Award
from the IEEE International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in
Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt) in 2015.
Lin Gao (S’08-M’10-SM’16) is an Associate Pro-
fessor with the School of Electronic and Information
Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology, Shen-
zhen, China. He received Ph.D. degree in Electronic
Engineering from Shanghai Jiao Tong University
in 2010 and served as a Postdoc Fellow in The
Chinese University of Hong Kong from 2010 to
2015. His main research interests are in the area of
network economics and games, with applications in
wireless communications and networking. He is the
co-receipt of 3 Best Paper Awards from WiOpt 2013,
2014, 2015, and 1 Best Paper Award Finalist from IEEE INFOCOM 2016. He
is a receipt of the IEEE ComSoc Asia-Pacific Outstanding Young Researcher
Award in 2016.
Ya-Feng Liu (M’12) received the B.Sc. degree in
applied mathematics in 2007 from Xidian University,
Xi’an, China, and the Ph.D. degree in computational
mathematics in 2012 from the Chinese Academy of
Sciences (CAS), Beijing, China. During his Ph.D.
study, he was supported by the Academy of Mathe-
matics and Systems Science (AMSS), CAS, to visit
Professor Zhi-Quan (Tom) Luo at the University of
Minnesota (Twins Cities) from February 2011 to
February 2012. After his graduation, he joined the
Institute of Computational Mathematics and Scien-
tific/Engineering Computing, AMSS, CAS, Beijing, China, in July 2012,
where he is currently an Assistant Professor. His main research interests
are nonlinear optimization and its applications to signal processing, wireless
communications, and machine learning. He is especially interested in design-
ing efficient algorithms for optimization problems arising from the above
applications. Dr. Liu has served as a guest editor of the Journal of Global
Optimization. He is a recipient of the Best Paper Award from the IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC) in 2011 and the Best
Student Paper Award from the International Symposium on Modeling and
Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt) in 2015.
Jianwei Huang (F’16) is a Professor in the De-
partment of Information Engineering at The Chinese
University of Hong Kong. He is the co-author of 9
Best Paper Awards, including IEEE Marconi Prize
Paper Award in Wireless Communications 2011. He
has co-authored six books, including the textbook on
“Wireless Network Pricing”. He has served as the
Chair of IEEE TCCN and MMTC. He is an IEEE
ComSoc Distinguished Lecturer and a Clarivate An-
alytics Highly Cited Researcher.
11
APPENDIX A
ALGORITHMS FOR OPTIMAL PRICE ASSIGNMENT
As discussed in Section VI-C, the optimal price assignment
{p∗k : k ∈ B} for (20) can be obtained by solving each price
individually according to (21), as long as the solutions of (21)
{p†k : k ∈ B} satisfy the constraint in (20). In the general case,
however, {p†k : k ∈ B} may not satisfy the constraint in (20),
and hence may not be feasible.
In this section, we propose a two-stage algorithm to solve
the optimal price assignment {p∗k : k ∈ B} for (20). In Stage
I, we use a Dual Algorithm to solve (20), where {p†k : k ∈ B}
computed in (21) will serve as the initial price choices. If the
solution returned by the Dual Algorithm is feasible, then it is
optimal to (20); otherwise, we use it as an initial point for a
Dynamic Algorithm in Stage II, which will return a feasible
(but sub-optimal) solution of (20).
A. Dual Algorithm
Let λk be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the linear
constraint pk ≤ pk+1, k = m,m + 1, . . . ,K − 1. We denote
p , {pk : k ∈ B}, and λ , {λk : k = m, · · · ,K − 1}. Then
the Lagrangian of problem (20) is:
L(p,λ) = −
∑
k∈B
fk(pk) +
K−1∑
k=m
λk(pk − pk+1), (23)
and it can be written as
L(p,λ) ,
∑
k∈B
Lk(pk,λ),
where Lk(pk,λ) only involves pk, and is defined as:
Lm(pm,λ) = −fm(pm) + λmpm, (24)
Lk(pk,λ) = −fk(pk) + (λk − λk−1)pk,m < k < K, (25)
LK(pK ,λ) = −fK(pK)− λK−1pK . (26)
The dual algorithm aims to solve the convex but possibly
nondifferentiable dual problem of (20):
max
λ≥0
d(λ), (27)
Algorithm 1 Dual Algorithm
Input: {p†k : k ∈ B}
Output: {pLk : k ∈ B}
1: Initiate λ0 = 0,λ−1 = −1, t = 0, {ptk : k ∈ B} = {p†k :
k ∈ B}
2: while If ∃ i such that |λti − λt−1i | >  do
3: For all k = m, . . . ,K − 1, update
λt+1k = max{λtk +
1√
t+ 1
(ptk − ptk+1), 0}. (22)
4: Calculate pt+1 = arg min0≤p≤pmax L(p,λ
t+1).
5: Set t = t+ 1.
6: end while
7: Set λL = λt,pL = pt.
where
d(λ) ,
∑
k∈B
min
0≤pk≤pmax
Lk(pk,λ). (28)
Computing d(λ) involves K −m + 1 separate subproblems,
min0≤pk≤pmax Lk(pk,λ), k ∈ B, where each subproblem is a
single variable minimization problem and is easy to solve.
Note that the right-hand side of (28) might have multiple
solutions, hence the dual function d(λ) may not be differ-
entiable. We apply the subgradient method to solve the dual
problem (27), i.e., we update the dual variable according to
(22) in Algorithm 1, where t is the iteration index. The update
rule (22) is intuitive: the dual variable λk increases if the
constraint pk ≤ pk+1 is violated. In Algorithm 1,  ∈ (0, 1)
is a tolerance parameter.
The sequence {λt} generated by Algorithm 1 converges to
an optimal dual solution. Let λL be the limiting point of the
sequences of {λt}, and
pL = arg
∑
k∈B
min
0≤pk≤pmax
Lk(pk,λ
L). (29)
By the weak duality theory, we have∑
k∈B
fk(p
L
k ) ≥
∑
k∈B
fk(p
∗
k). (30)
Recall that {p∗k : k ∈ B} is the optimal solution of Problem
3. Hence, if {pLk : k ∈ B} is feasible to problem (20), it is
the optimal solution to problem (20), i.e., {p∗k : k ∈ B} =
{pLk : k ∈ B}. If {pLk : k ∈ B} is not feasible to problem (20),
we will further compute a feasible solution using the dynamic
algorithm introduced later.
To summarize, the dual algorithm fully takes advantage of
the separable structure of the objective function in problem
(20); it is easy to implement, since the optimal solution of the
Lagrangian can be obtained easily; it provides an upper bound
of problem (20); it is possible to return the global solution
of problem (20) with a certificate (if the returned solution is
feasible); if not, it returns a good approximate solution, which
can be used as an initial point for local searching.
B. Dynamic Algorithm
Now we deal with the case where {pLk : k ∈ B} is not
feasible.
Definition 4 (Infeasible Sub-sequence). We denote a sub-
sequence of {pk : k ∈ B}, say {pi, pi+1, . . . , pj}, as an
infeasible sub-sequence, if pi ≥ pi+1 ≥ · · · ≥ pj and pi > pj .
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Algorithm
Input: {pLk : k ∈ B}
Output: {pDk : k ∈ B}
1: Initiate {pDk : k ∈ B} = {pLk : k ∈ B}
2: while {pDk : k ∈ B} is infeasible do
3: Find the first and shortest infeasible sub-sequence
{pDi , pDi+1, . . . , pDj } of {pDk , k ∈ B}.
4: Set pDk = arg max
0≤p≤pmax
j∑
t=i
ft(p), ∀k = i, . . . , j.
5: end while
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We propose to use a Dynamic Algorithm in Algorithm 2
(based on a similar algorithm proposed in [14]) to make all the
infeasible sub-sequences in {pLk : k ∈ B} feasible, by enforc-
ing all prices in the infeasible sub-sequence to be equal (Line
4 of Algorithm 2). Specifically, for an infeasible sub-sequence
{pi, pi+1, . . . , pj}, we combine fi(pi), fi+1(pi+1), . . . , fj(pj)
and select an identical price for pi, pi+1, · · · , pj by:
pi = pi+1 = · · · = pj = arg max
0≤p≤pmax
j∑
t=i
ft(p). (31)
It is easy to solve (31), as it has only a single variable p. We
denote the solution returned by Algorithm 2 as {pDk : k ∈ B}.
The Dynamic Algorithm will terminate within K−m times,
as we combine at least two different fi(·) at each time, hence
we need to do at most K −m times.
Since {pDk : k ∈ B} satisfies the constraints of problem
(20), it provides a lower bound of problem (20), i.e.,∑
k∈B
fk(p
D
k ) ≤
∑
k∈B
fk(p
∗
k). (32)
C. Complexity Analysis
We now analyze the complexity of the above algorithms.
Specifically, we first need to derive the best subscription fees
{δk : k ∈ B}, given the feasible price assignment {p0,
pk : k ∈ B} and the critical type m. Note that the closed-
form expressions of the best subscription fees are given in
(18) and (19), and hence can be computed without involving
complicated optimization.
Then, we adopt a two-stage algorithm to solve the price
assignment {p0, pk : k ∈ B}, given the critical type m. The
complexity of the Dual Algorithm in Stage I is K · O (1/2).
Specifically, the complexity to calculate the dual objective
function value and the corresponding subgradient value once
is K. The stopping criterion of the Dual Algorithm is that the
difference between the objectives of two consecutive iterations
is no larger than the tolerance parameter . The complexity
of such iterations is O (1/2) [30]. The complexity of the
Dynamic Algorithm in Stage II is K ·O(1), which is negligible
compared with the complexity of the Dual Algorithm.
Finally, substituting the obtained subscription fees and price
assignment, we can find the critical type m∗ through exhaus-
tive search. Obviously, we only need to search K + 1 times
for m∗. In summary, the overall complexity of our proposed
algorithm is
(K + 1) ·K · O
(
1
2
)
.
APPENDIX B
HETEROGENEOUS MOBILITY SCENARIO
In the previous discussion, we consider the homogenous
mobility scenario, where different APOs have the same mo-
bility pattern. In this section, we will study a more general
scenario with the heterogeneous mobility, where different
APOs may have different mobility patterns, i.e., different
probabilities of staying at home (or traveling outside).
Similar as the APO quality model, We consider a finite and
discrete setM = {1, 2, . . . , L} of L possible probabilities (of
staying at home) for APOs, and denote ηl, l ∈ M as the l-th
probability. Without loss of generality, we assume:
η1 < η2 < · · · < ηL.
Recall that in our previous analysis, all APOs are divided
into K types based on their provided Wi-Fi access qualities,
and a type-k APO’s Wi-Fi access quality is denoted by
θk,∀k ∈ K. In this section, each APO is characterized not
only by his provided Wi-Fi access quality, but also by his
mobility pattern. Hence, all APOs can be divided into K ×L
types based on their provided Wi-Fi access qualities and their
mobility patterns, where a type-{k, l} APO provides the Wi-Fi
access with quality θk and stays at home with probability ηl.
Note that θk and ηl are private information of each APO, and
are not known by the network operator.
A. Contract Formulation
To induce APOs to reveal their private information truth-
fully, the operator needs to design a contract item for each
type of APO (characterized by θk and ηl). Hence, the contract
that the operator offers is
Φ = {φk,l , (pk,l, δk,l) : k ∈ K, l ∈M}. (33)
Here the contract item φk,l is designed for the type-{k, l}
APO. A special combination φ0 = (0, 0) indicates the mem-
bership choice of Linus. We let Nk,l denote the number of the
type-{k, l} APOs. We let L(Φ) denote the set of all Linus,
and let B(Φ) denote the set of all Bills. We further denote
Ll(Φ) as the set of Linus with ηl, and denote Bl(Φ) as the set
of Bills with ηl, for all l ∈ M. When there is no confusion,
we will also write L for L(Φ), and similarly for B,Ll,Bl.
Similar as in Section IV, we characterize the network
operator’s profit and each APO’s payoff under a given feasible
contract, where each APO chooses the contract item designed
for his type.
The network operator’s profit includes the profit achieved
from all Linus’ APs and the profit achieved from all Bill APs,
and can be computed as follows: L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Ll
Nk,l
 L∑
j=1
∑
i∈Bj
1− ηj
N
Ni,j + a
 p0dk(p0)

+
L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Bl
Nk,lδk,l. (34)
If a type-{k, l} APO chooses to be a Linus, his payoff is
the difference between utility and cost,
uk,l(φ0) = ηlUH + (1− ηl)UR − CS. (35)
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If a type-{k, l} APO chooses to be a Bill, his payoff is the
difference between his revenue, utility, and cost,
uk,l(φk,l; Φ) =ωl(Φ)gk(pk,l)− δk,l − βk,l(Φ)
+ ηlUH + (1− ηl)UR − CS.
(36)
Here ωl(Φ) is the expected number of paying users (including
others type-{k, l} Bills characterized by θk and ηl, all other
types of Bills, and all Aliens) accessing this AP:
ωl(Φ) ,
∑L
j=1
∑
i∈Bj
1−ηj
N Ni,j +
1
NNA − 1−ηlN , (37)
and βk,l(Φ) is the expected payment of this type-{k, l} APO
for accessing other APs:
βk,l(Φ) , 1−ηlN
[∑L
j=1
∑
i∈Bj Ni,jgi(pi,j)
+
L∑
j=1
∑
i∈Lj
Ni,jgi(p0)− gk(pk,l)
]
. (38)
For notational convenience, we denote
µ(Φ) =
L∑
j=1
∑
i∈Bj
1− ηj
N
Ni,j +
NA
N
,
ν(Φ) =
L∑
j=1
∑
i∈Bj
Ni,jgi(pi,j) +
L∑
j=1
∑
i∈Lj
Ni,jgi(p0).
Then, a Bill APO’s payoff can be written as
uk,l(φk,l; Φ) = µ(Φ)gk(pk,l)− δk,l − 1− ηl
N
ν(Φ). (39)
When there is no confusion, we will also write ωl for ωl(Φ),
and similarly for βk,l, µ, ν.
B. Feasibility of Contract
We now characterize the necessary conditions for a feasible
contract.
Lemma 5. If a contract Φ is feasible, then
pk,l > pi,j ⇐⇒ δk,l > δi,j , ∀k ∈ Bl, i ∈ Bj , l, j ∈M.
Lemma 6. If a contract Φ is feasible, then
θk > θi =⇒ pk,l > pi,l,∀k, i ∈ Bl, for the same l ∈M,
ηl > ηj =⇒ pk,l ≥ pk,j ,∀l, j ∈M, for the same k ∈ Bl,Bj ,
ηl < ηj and θk > θi =⇒ pk,l > pi,j ,∀k ∈ Bl, i ∈ Bj , l, j ∈M.
Lemma 5 shows that in the heterogeneous mobility scenario,
a larger Wi-Fi access price corresponds to a larger subscription
fee (for Bill). Lemma 6 shows that with the same probability of
staying at home, an APO who provides a higher Wi-Fi quality
will be designed with a higher Wi-Fi access price. With the
same Wi-Fi quality, an APO who has a larger probability of
staying at home will be designed with a higher Wi-Fi access
price.11 What is most significant is the their relationship in
Lemma 6: if an APO provides a higher Wi-Fi quality, even if
he stays at home with a smaller probability, he will be designed
11For an APO with a larger probability of staying at home, the average
number of users accessing his AP is higher than the average number of users
accessing an other APO (who has a relatively lower probability of staying
at home). Therefore, the operator can potentially set a higher Wi-Fi access
price, due to the higher demand.
with a higher Wi-Fi access price, which implies that the Wi-Fi
quality is more important than the mobility pattern.
Lemma 7. If a contract Φ is feasible, then there exists a
critical APO type ml ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K + 1} for each ηl (∀l ∈
M), such that k ∈ Ll for all k < ml and k ∈ Bl for all
k ≥ ml, i.e.,
Ll = {1, 2, . . . ,ml − 1},Bl = {ml,ml + 1, . . . ,K},∀l ∈M.
Lemma 8. If a contract Φ is feasible, then
ml ≤ mj ,∀ l > j where l, j ∈M.
Lemma 7 shows that for APOs with the same probability
of staying at home, there exists a critical APO type: all APOs
with types lower than the critical type will choose to be Linus,
and all APOs with types higher than or equal to the critical
type will choose to be Bills. Lemma 8 shows that APOs who
stay at home with a larger probability are more likely to choose
to be Bills.
By Lemmas 6, 7, and 8, we can provide a lower bound and
an upper bound for each Bill’s price:
pk−1,L ≤ pk,1 ≤ pk,2,∀k ∈ B1,
max {pk,l−1, pk−1,L} ≤ pk,l ≤ pk,l+1,
∀k ∈ Bl,∀1 < l < L,
max {pk,L−1, pk−1,L} ≤ pk,L ≤ pk+1,j ,
∀k ∈ BL, j = mini∈M{i : k + 1 ≥ mi}.
(40)
Recall that a Linus APO will choose the contract item φ0 =
(0, 0), i.e., set his price to be p = 0. Hence, if the type-
{k−1, L} APO chooses to be a Linus, then pk−1,L = 0. Note
that pk−1,L ≤ pk,l and pk,L ≤ pk+1,j are due to the third
relationship in Lemma 6, and j = mini∈M{i : k + 1 ≥ mi}
enables that the type-{k + 1, j} APO chooses to be a Bill
and has the smallest probability of staying at home among
Bills with θk+1. Intuitively, the relationships in (40) can be
interpreted from two aspects: (a) a Bill APO who provides
a higher Wi-Fi quality will be designed with a higher Wi-
Fi access price, regardless of the mobility pattern; (b) with
the same Wi-Fi access quality, a Bill APO who has a larger
probability of staying at home will be designed with a higher
Wi-Fi access price.
To illustrate the relationship among all APOs’ prices, we
provide a simple example where K = 4, L = 5,m1 =
5,m2 = 4,m2 = 3, and m4 = m5 = 1. The price matrix
of all APOs in the toy example is as follows:
0 0 0 p1,4 p1,5
0 0 0 p2,4 p2,5
0 0 p3,3 p3,4 p3,5
0 p4,2 p4,3 p4,4 p4,5

where APOs in the same column have the same ηl (l ∈ M),
and APOs in the same row have the same θk (k ∈ K). The
0 elements represent the choices of Linus, while the elements
pk,l (∀k ∈ K, l ∈ M) represent the choices of Bill. From
(40), we know that Bills’ prices satisfy:
p1,4 ≤ p1,5 ≤ p2,4 ≤ p2,5 ≤ p3,3 ≤ · · · ≤ p4,5.
We now characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions
for a feasible contract.
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Theorem 2 (Feasible Contract). A contract Φ = {φk,l : k ∈
K, l ∈ M} is feasible, if and only if the following conditions
hold:
Ll = {1, . . . ,ml − 1},Bl = {ml, . . . ,K},
ml ∈ {1, ...,K + 1},∀l ∈M, (41)
m1 ≥ m2 ≥ m3 ≥ · · · ≥ mL, (42)
0 ≤ p0 ≤ pmax, 0 ≤ pk,l ≤ pmax, ∀k ∈ K,∀l ∈M, (43)
pk−1,L ≤ pk,1 ≤ pk,2, ∀k ∈ B1, (44)
max {pk,l−1, pk−1,L} ≤ pk,l ≤ pk,l+1,
∀k ∈ Bl,∀1 < l < L, (45)
max {pk,L−1, pk−1,L} ≤ pk,L ≤ pk+1,j ,
∀k ∈ BL, j = min
i∈M
{i : k + 1 ≥ mi}, (46)
δk,l ≥ µ(Φ)gi(pk,l)− 1− ηj
N
ν(Φ),
∀k ∈ Bl, i ∈ Lj , l, j ∈M, (47)
δk,l ≤ ωl(Φ)gk(pk,l)− βk,l(Φ),∀k ∈ Bl, l ∈M, (48)
ωj(Φ) (gi(pk,l)− gi(pi,j)) ≤ δk,l − δi,j
≤ ωl(Φ) (gk(pk,l)− gk(pi,j)) ,∀k ∈ Bl, i ∈ Bj , l, j ∈M.
(49)
C. Optimal Contract Design
The optimal contract is the one that maximizes the network
operator’s profit. Given the network operator’s profit (34) and
using Theorem 2, we can formulate the following contract
optimization problem:
Problem 4 (Optimal Contract (Heterogeneous Mobility)).
max
 L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Ll
Nk,l
 L∑
j=1
∑
i∈Bj
1− ηj
N
Ni,j + a
 p0dk(p0)

+
L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Bl
Nk,lδk,l
s.t. (41)− (49)
var: {ml : ∀l ∈M}, p0, {(pk,l, δk,l) : ∀l ∈M, k ∈ Bl}.
Next we define the feasible price assignment under hetero-
geneous mobility, which will be used in later discussions.
Definition 5 (Feasible Price Assignment in Heterogeneous
Mobility). A price assignment {p0, pk,l : l ∈ M, k ∈ Bl}
is feasible if it satisfies constraints (43), (44), (45), and (46).
We solve Problem 3 in the following steps similar as in
Section VI. First, we derive a closed-form solution of the best
subscription fees {δk,l : l ∈ M, k ∈ Bl}, given the feasible
price assignment {p0, pk,l : l ∈M, k ∈ Bl} and critical types
{ml : l ∈ M}. Then, we propose an algorithm to solve the
optimal price assignment {p0, pk,l : l ∈ M, k ∈ Bl}, given
the critical types {ml : l ∈ M}. Finally, based on the best
subscription fees and price assignment, we search the critical
types {ml : l ∈M} for the optimal contract.
We first derive the best subscription fees, given the feasible
price assignment and critical types.
Problem 5 (Optimal Subscription Fees (Heterogeneous
Mobility)).
max
L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Bl
Nk,lδk,l
s.t. (47), (48), (49)
var: δk,l,∀l ∈M, k ∈ Bl.
Lemma 9 gives the optimal solution of Problem 5.
Lemma 9. Given critical types {ml : ∀l ∈M} and a feasible
price assignment {p0, pk,l : ∀l ∈ M, k ∈ Bl}, the optimal
subscription fees {δ∗k,l : ∀l ∈M, k ∈ Bl} are given by:
δ∗mj ,j = ωjgmj (pmj ,j)− βmj ,j , j = mini∈M{i : mi = mL},
(54)
δ∗k,l = δ
∗
k,l−1 + ωl (gk(pk,l)− gk(pk,l−1)) ,
∀l ∈M, k ≥ ml−1, (55)
δ∗k,l = δ
∗
k−1,L + ωl (gk(pk,l)− gk−1(pk−1,L)) ,
∀l ∈M, k < ml−1. (56)
Note that ωj , ωl and βmj ,j depend on {ml : ∀l ∈ M} and
{p0, pk,l : ∀l ∈ M, k ∈ Bl}, and can be calculated by (37)
and (38). Define sk,l =
∑
j≥lNk,j +
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Bj ,i>kNi,j
for all l ∈M, k ∈ Bl. Based on Lemma 9, we can rewrite the
network operator’s profit from Bills as follows:
L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Bl
Nk,lδ
∗
k,l ,
L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Bl
fk,l(pk,l),
where fk,l(pk,l) only depends on pk,l, and is defined in (50),
(51), (52), and (53).
Next we solve the operator’s optimal prices, given critical
types {ml : ∀l ∈ M}. Substitute the best subscription fees
{δ∗k,l : ∀l ∈ M, k ∈ Bl} in Lemma 9, we have the following
optimization problem.
Problem 6 (Optimal Price Assignment (Heterogeneous
Mobility)).
max
 L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Ll
Nk,l
 L∑
j=1
∑
i∈Bj
1− ηj
N
Ni,j + a
 p0dk(p0)

+
L∑
l=1
∑
k∈Bl
fk,l(pk,l)
s.t. (43), (44), (45), (46)
var: p0, {pk,l : ∀l ∈M, k ∈ Bl}.
Finally, after obtaining the subscription fees and the price
assignment, we can sequentially search for the optimal critical
type {m∗l : l ∈M}. Due to constraints (41) and (42), we only
need to search (K + 1)(K + 2)/2 times for {m∗l : l ∈M}.
D. More Simulations under Heterogeneous Mobility
In Section VII-B, we have shown how the critical AP types
m1 and m2 change with the mobility parameters η under the
uniform APO type distribution, where the number of each
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fmj ,j(pmj ,j) =
(
1−ηj
N + ωj
)
smj ,jgmj (pmj ,j)− ωj+1smj ,j+1gmj (pmj ,j), j = mini∈M{i : mi = mL}, (50)
fk,l(pk,l) = ωlsk,lgk(pk,l)− ωl+1sk,l+1gk(pk,l), l < L, k ∈ Bl, (51)
fk,L(pk,L) = ωLsk,Lgk(pk,L)− ωisk+1,igk+1(pk,L), k ∈ BL, i = min
l∈M
{l : k + 1 ≥ ml}, (52)
fK,L(pK,L) = ωLNK,LgK(pK,L). (53)
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Figure 9. Distribution of APOs (Case I: low type APO dominant; Case II:
medium type APO dominant; Case III: high type APO dominant)
type of APOs is the same Nk,l = 100,∀k ∈ K, l ∈ M. In
this section, we provide more simulation results under three
different APO type distributions illustrated in Figure 9. We
show the new simulation results in Figures 10-12, and can
obtain the following observations.
First, the critical AP type m1 decreases with η1, i.e., more
APOs who stay at home with a probability η1 choose to be
Bills as η1 increases. The reason is that as η1 increases, APOs
with η1 stay at home with a larger probability and travel to
other APs with a smaller probability. So APOs with η1 prefer
to be Bills (to gain profit at her own APs) rather than be Linus
(to enjoy free Wi-Fi at other APs). Hence, more APOs with
η1 choose to be Bills as η1 increases.
Second, the critical AP type m2 increases with η1, i.e., less
APOs who stay at home with probability a η2 choose to be
Bills as η1 increases. The reason is that as η1 increases from
a medium to a large value, Bill APOs with η1 stay at home
with a larger probability, so the profit achieved by Bills from
these paying users (Bill APOs with η1) will decrease. Hence,
less APOs with η2 choose to be Bills.
Third, more APOs will choose to be Linus in Case III (high
type APO dominant) than in the other two cases. The reason is
that higher type APOs charge higher prices (and many of them
charge pmax). In the high type APO dominant case (Case III),
on average it is more expensive for a Bill to access other APs.
As a result, a lower type APO’s payoff as a Bill is smaller
due to the higher payment on other APs. Hence, more APOs
will choose to be Linus.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS
A. Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. We prove this lemma by using the IC constraint.
First, we show that if pi > pj , then δi > δj . For any type-j
Bill (APO), the following IC constraint must be satisfied:
uj(pj , δj ; Φ) ≥ uj(pi, δi; Φ), ∀i ∈ B.
That is, ω(Φ)gj(pj)− δj−βj(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gj(pi)− δi−βj(Φ),
which implies that δi − δj ≥ ω(Φ)(gj(pi)− gj(pj)) > 0.
Then, we show that if δi > δj , then pi > pj . For any type-i
Bill (APO), the following IC constraint must be satisfied:
ui(pi, δi; Φ) ≥ ui(pj , δj ; Φ), ∀j ∈ B.
That is, ω(Φ)gi(pi)− δi− βi(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gi(pj)− δj − βi(Φ),
which implies that gi(pi)− gi(pj) ≥ δi−δjω(Φ) > 0. According to
Assumption 1.(b), we have pi > pj .
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We prove the lemma by the contradiction principle.
Assume to the contrary that there exists θi > θj and pi < pj .
From the IC constraints for the type-i (∀i ∈ B) APOs and
the type-j (∀j ∈ B) APOs, we have
ui(φi; Φ) ≥ ui(φj ; Φ), uj(φj ; Φ) ≥ uj(φi; Φ),
which are equivalent to
ω(Φ)gi(pi)− δi − βi(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gi(pj)− δj − βi(Φ),
ω(Φ)gj(pj)− δj − βj(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gj(pi)− δi − βj(Φ).
Combining the above two inequations, we have
gi(pi)− gi(pj) ≥ gj(pi)− gj(pj).
This contracts with Assumption 1(c). Hence we complete the
proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We prove the lemma by the contradiction principle.
Suppose a type-j APO chooses to be Linus, but a type-i (i <
j) APO chooses to be Bill.
From the IC constraint for the type-j (Linus) APO, we have
uj(pi, δi; Φ) ≤ uj(0, 0),
equivalently,
µ(Φ)gj(pi)− δi − ν(Φ) ≤ 0.
Then for the type-i (i < j) (Bill) APO, we have
ui(pi, δi; Φ) = µ(Φ)gi(pi)− δi − ν(Φ)
< µ(Φ)gj(pi)− δi − ν(Φ) = uj(pi, δi; Φ) ≤ 0
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Figure 10. Impact of η1 to Critical AP Types
(Case I: low type APO dominant)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
5
10
15
20
η1
C
rit
ic
al
 A
P
 T
yp
e
m1 (Case II)
m2 (Case II)
Figure 11. Impact of η1 to Critical AP Types
(Case II: medium type APO dominant)
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Figure 12. Impact of η1 to Critical AP Types
(Case III: high type APO dominant)
which contradicts with the IR constraint for the type-i (Bill)
APO.
Therefore, for a feasible contract Φ = {φk : ∀k ∈ K}, there
exists a critical AP type m such that k ∈ L for all k < m,
and k ∈ B for all k ≥ m.
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We first prove that the conditions in Theorem 1 are
sufficient by mathematical induction.
We denote Φ(m− 1 + n) as a subset of Φ which contains
the first m− 1 + n contract items in Φ, i.e., Φ(m− 1 + n) =
{(0, 0) : k ∈ L} ∪ {(pk, δk) : k ∈ B} with |L| = m − 1 and
|B| = n. Let Φ(m − 1 + n) be a contract for the network
which contains the first m− 1 +n types of AP owners of the
original network.
Obviously, m = K+ 1 indicates that all AP owners choose
to be Linus. In the following proof, we consider the case where
m ≤ K.
We first verify that Φ(m) = {(0, 0) : ∀k = 1, 2, . . . ,m −
1} ∪ {(pm, δm)} is feasible, where only the type-m APOs
choose to be Bills, while other types of APOs choose to be
Linus. The conditions for such a contract to be feasible are
the IR and IC constraints for all APOs. Obviously, conditions
in Theorem 1 imply
ω(Φ)gm(pm)− δm − βm(Φ) ≥ 0,
µ(Φ)gj(pm)− δm − ν(Φ) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ L.
Thus the IR and IC constraints for all APOs are satisfied and
Φ(m) is a feasible contract.
We then show that if Φ(m − 1 + k) = {(0, 0) : ∀i =
1, . . . ,m− 1}∪{(pi, δi) : ∀i = m, . . . ,m− 1 +k} (k ≥ 1) is
a feasible contract, then Φ(m+k) is also feasible. To achieve
this, we need to prove that (I) for the new type θm+k, the IC
and IR constraints are satisfied, i.e.,
ω(Φ)gm+k(pm+k)− δm+k − βm+k(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gm+k(pi)
−δi − βm+k(Φ),∀i = m, . . . ,m− 1 + k,
ω(Φ)gm+k(pm+k)− δm+k − βm+k(Φ) ≥ 0,
and (II) for the existing types θ1, . . . , θm−1, θm, . . . , θm−1+k,
the IC constraints are still satisfied in the presence of type
θm+k, i.e.,
µ(Φ)gj(pm+k)− δm+k − ν(Φ) ≤ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
ω(Φ)gi(pi)− δi − βi(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gi(pm+k)− δm+k
−βi(Φ),∀i = m, . . . ,m− 1 + k.
Next, we prove (I) and (II) separately.
Proof of I: Since
δm+k − δi ≤ ω(Φ) (gm+k(pm+k)− gm+k(pi)) ,
∀i = m, . . . ,m− 1 + k,
we have
ω(Φ)gm+k(pm+k)− δm+k − βm+k(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gm+k(pi)
− δi − βm+k(Φ), ∀i = m, . . . ,m− 1 + k,
which proves that the IC constraint is satisfied. Since
δm+k ≤ ω(Φ)gm+k(pm+k)− βm+k(Φ)
we have
ω(Φ)gm+k(pm+k)− δm+k − βm+k(Φ) ≥ 0,
which proves that the IR constraint is satisfied.
Proof of II: Since
δm+k ≥ µ(Φ)gj(pm+k)− ν(Φ),∀j = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
we have
µ(Φ)gj(pm+k)− δm+k − ν(Φ) ≤ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
which proves that the IC constraints for the Linus AP owners
in the set L = {1, . . . ,m−1} are satisfied. Since δm+k−δi ≥
ω(Φ) (gi(pm+k)− gi(pi)) , ∀i = m, . . . ,m− 1 + k, we have
ω(Φ)gi(pi)− δi − βi(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gi(pm+k)− δm+k − βi(Φ),
∀i = m, . . . ,m− 1 + k,
which proves the IC constraints for the Bill AP owners in the
set B = {m, . . . ,m− 1 + k}.
Up to present, we have proved that (i) Φ(m) is feasible, and
(ii) if Φ(m− 1 + k) (for k ≥ 1) is feasible, then Φ(m+ k) is
feasible. It follows that Φ = Φ(K) is feasible.
Now we prove that the conditions in Theorem 1 are neces-
sary. Note that (13) has been proved by Lemma 3, and (14) has
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been proved by Lemma 2. We now prove that (15), (16), and
(17) are necessary by using the IC and IR constraints APOs in
the network. For any type-j (∀j ∈ L) Linus APO, his payoff
by choosing to be a Linus is no smaller than the payoff by
choosing any contract item (pk, δk), ∀k ∈ B designed for a
Bill under a feasible contract, i.e., the following IC constraint
must be satisfied:
uj(pk, δk; Φ) ≤ uj(0, 0),
which is
µ(Φ)gj(pk)− δk − ν(Φ) ≤ 0.
This implies that (15) in Theorem 1 is satisfied:
δk ≥ µ(Φ)gj(pk)− ν(Φ), ∀k ∈ B,∀j ∈ L.
For any type-k (∀k ∈ B) Bill APO, the following IR constraint
must be satisfied:
uk(pk, δk; Φ) ≥ 0,
which is
ω(Φ)gk(pk)− δk − βk(Φ) ≥ 0.
This implies that (16) in Theorem 1 is satisfied:
δk ≤ ω(Φ)gk(pk)− βk(Φ), ∀k ∈ B.
For any type-k (∀k ∈ B) Bill APO and type-i (∀i < k, i ∈ B)
Bill APO, the following IC constraints must be satisfied:
uk(pk, δk; Φ) ≥ uk(pi, δi; Φ),
ui(pi, δi; Φ) ≥ ui(pk, δk; Φ),
equivalently,
ω(Φ)gk(pk)− δk − βk(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gk(pi)− δi − βk(Φ),
ω(Φ)gi(pi)− δi − βi(Φ) ≥ ω(Φ)gi(pk)− δk − βi(Φ).
This implies that (17) in Theorem 1 is satisfied:
ω(Φ) (gi(pk)− gi(pi)) ≤ δk − δi ≤ ω(Φ) (gk(pk)− gk(pi)) ,
∀k, i ∈ B, i < k.
E. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We first prove that the subscription fees in (18) and
(19) form a feasible subscription fee assignment, i.e., they
satisfy the conditions (15), (16), and (17). Obviously, δ∗m in
(18) is feasible, that is, it satisfies (15)–(17). For δ∗m+1 = δ
∗
m+
ω (gm+1(pm+1)− gm+1(pm)]), we first prove that it satisfies
(15). We know that
δ∗m+1 − δ∗m = ω (gm+1(pm+1)− gm+1(pm)) ,
δm+1 − δm = ω (gm−1(pm+1)− gm−1(pm)) .
Given Assumption 1(c), the above two equations lead to:
δ∗m+1 ≥ δm+1 + δ∗m − δm ≥ δm+1,
which proves that δ∗m+1 satisfies (15). We then prove that δ
∗
m+1
satisfies (16):
δ∗m+1 =ωgm(pm)− βk + ω (gm+1(pm+1)− gm+1(pm))
=µgm(pm)− ν + ω (gm+1(pm+1)− gm+1(pm))
≤µgm(pm)− ν + µ (gm+1(pm+1)− gm+1(pm))
=µgm+1(pm+1)− µ (gm+1(pm)− gm(pm))− ν
≤µgm+1(pm+1)− ν
=ωgm+1(pm+1)− βm+1 = δ¯m+1.
Finally, δ∗m+1 satisfies (17) since δ
∗
m+1 − δ∗m =
ω (gm+1(pm+1)− gm+1(pm)). Hence, δ∗m+1 in (19) is
feasible, that is, it satisfies (15)–(17). Similarly, δ∗k (for all
k ∈ {m+ 1, . . . ,K}) in (19) is feasible.
Now we prove that the monthly subscription fees in (18) and
(19) form a best monthly fee assignment that can maximize
the operator’s profit. The operator’s profit collected from Bill
APs is
∑
k∈BNkδk. Assume there is a monthly subscription
fees assignment {δ˜k} such that
∑
k∈BNk δ˜k >
∑
k∈BNkδ
∗
k.
So there is at least one fee δ˜i > δ∗i . To make the contract
feasible, {δ˜k} must satisfy the following constraint according
to Theorem 1:
δ˜i ≤ δ˜i−1 + ω(gi(pi)− gi(pi−1)).
Combining the above equation with (19), we have:
δ˜i−1 ≥ δ˜i − ω(gi(pi)− gi(pi−1))
> δ∗i − ω(gi(pi)− gi(pi−1)) = δ∗i−1.
Continuing the above process, we can finally obtain that δ˜m >
δ∗m = ωgm(pm)−βm, which violates the IR constraint for type
m. Therefore, there does not exist any feasible {δ˜k} such that∑
k∈BNk δ˜k >
∑
k∈BNkδ
∗
k, which implies that the revenue
is maximized under {δ∗k}.
Then we show that {δ∗k} is the unique best monthly fees
assignment. Assume there is a {δ˜k} 6= {δ∗k} such that∑
k∈BNk δ˜k =
∑
k∈BNkδ
∗
k. Without loss of generality, we
assume that there is one fee δ˜j < δ∗j . It is easy to see
that there must exist another fee δ˜i > δ∗i . Using the same
argument, we can obtain that δ˜m > δ∗m = ωgm(pm) − βm.
Therefore, there does not exist any feasible {δ˜k} 6= {δ∗k} such
that
∑
k∈BNk δ˜k =
∑
k∈BNkδ
∗
k, which implies that the best
monthly fees assignment {δ∗k} is unique.
F. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We prove this lemma by using the IC constraint.
We first prove that if pk,l > pi,j , then δk,l > δi,j . For
any APO characterized by ηj (j ∈ M) and θi (i ∈ Bj), the
following IC constraint must be satisfied:
ui,j(pi,j , δi,j ; Φ) ≥ ui,j(pk,l, δk,l; Φ),∀l ∈M, k ∈ Bl,
which is
ωj(Φ)gi(pi,j)−δi,j−βi,j(Φ) ≥ ωj(Φ)gi(pk,l)−δk,l−βi,j(Φ).
This implies
δk,l − δi,j ≥ ωj(Φ)(gi(pk,l)− gi(pi,j)) > 0,
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which follows the fact that gi(p) is an strictly increasing
function with respect to p.
We now prove that if δk,l > δi,j , then pk,l > pi,j . For
any APO characterized by ηl (l ∈ M) and θk (k ∈ Bl), the
following IC constraint must be satisfied:
uk,l(pk,l, δk,l; Φ) ≥ uk,l(pi,j , δi,j ; Φ),∀j ∈ B,
which is
ωl(Φ)gk(pk,l)−δk,l−βk,l(Φ) ≥ ωl(Φ)gk(pi,j)−δi,j−βk,l(Φ).
This implies
gk(pk,l)− gk(pi,j) ≥ δk,l − δi,j
ωl(Φ)
> 0.
Since gi(p) monotonically increases with p, we have
pk,l > pi,j .
G. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. From the IC constraints for the APOs characterized by
ηl (l ∈ M) and θk (k ∈ Bl) and the APOs characterized by
ηj (j ∈M) and θi (i ∈ Bj), we have
uk,l(pk,l, δk,l; Φ) ≥ uk,l(pi,j , δi,j ; Φ),
ui,j(pi,j , δi,j ; Φ) ≥ ui,j(pk,l, δk,l; Φ),
which are equivalent to
ωl(Φ)gk(pk,l)− δk,l − βk,l(Φ) ≥ ωl(Φ)gk(pi,j)− δi,j − βk,l(Φ),
ωj(Φ)gi(pi,j)− δi,j − βi,j(Φ) ≥ ωj(Φ)gi(pk,l)− δk,l − βi,j(Φ).
Combining the above two inequations, we have
ωl(Φ)(gk(pk,l)−gk(pi,j)) ≥ ωj(Φ)(gi(pk,l)−gi(pi,j)). (57)
If j = l and θk > θi, (57) is equivalent to
gk(pk,l)− gk(pi,l) ≥ gi(pk,l)− gi(pi,l),
which implies that pk,l > pi,l.
If i = k and ηl > ηj , (57) is equivalent to
ωl(Φ)(gk(pk,l)− gk(pk,j)) ≥ ωj(Φ)(gk(pk,l)− gk(pk,j)),
which implies that pk,l ≥ pk,j .
If ηl < ηj and θk > θi, (57) is equivalent to
gk(pk,l)− gk(pi,j) > gi(pk,l)− gi(pi,j),
which implies that pk,l > pi,j .
H. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. We prove the lemma by the contradiction principle.
Suppose the APOs characterized by ηl (l ∈M) and θk choose
to be Linus, but the APOs characterized by ηl (l ∈ M) and
θi (i < k) choose to be Bills.
From the IC constraint for the (Linus) APO characterized
by ηl and θk, we have
uk,l(pi,l, δi,l; Φ) ≤ uk,l(0, 0),
equivalently,
µ(Φ)gk(pi,l)− δi,l − 1− ηl
N
ν(Φ) ≤ 0.
For the (Bill) APO characterized by ηl and θi (i < k), we
have
ui,l(pi,l, δi,l; Φ) = µ(Φ)gi(pi,l)− δi,l − 1− ηl
N
ν(Φ)
< µ(Φ)gk(pi,l)− δi,l − 1− ηl
N
ν(Φ)
= uk,l(pi,l, δi,l; Φ) ≤ 0,
which contradicts with the IR constraint for the (Bill) APO ηl
and θi (i < k).
Therefore, for a feasible contract Φ, there exists a critical
APO type ml ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K+ 1} for each ηl (∀l ∈M) such
that k ∈ Ll for all k < ml, and k ∈ Bl for all k ≥ ml.
I. Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction. Assume to the
contrary that ∃l > j such that ml > mj . Then there exists
k ∈ K such that k ∈ Ll (the type-(k, l) APOs choose to be
Linus), but k ∈ Bj (the type-(k, j) APOs choose to be Bills).
From the IC constraint for the type-{k, j} (Bill) APO
(characterized by ηj and θk), we have
uk,j(pk,j , δk,j ; Φ) = µgk(pk,j)− δk,j − 1− ηj
N
ν ≥ 0.
Since l > j, we have ηl > ηj . Then for the type-{k, l}
Linus APO (characterized by ηl and θk), if he chooses to be
Bill, we have
uk,l(pk,j , δk,j ; Φ) = µgk(pk,j)− δk,j − 1− ηl
N
ν
> µgk(pk,j)− δk,j − 1− ηj
N
ν ≥ 0,
which contradicts with the IC constraint for the type-{k, l}
Linus APO.
Hence, we have ml ≤ mj ,∀l, j ∈M, l > j.
